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OCTAVIO E. CHAVEZ*

The 1994-95 Drought, What Did We
Learn from It?: The Mexican

Perspective'
INTRODUCTION
Within the north central and northeastern geographic regions of
Mexico lies the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo basin. This region is mostly a semiarid area with low annual rainfall. The river basin is shared by the United
States and Mexico, with the river serving as the international boundary
along a 2,000 kilometer stretch. An international water treaty between the
two countries frames water management of the river basin's lower part,
from Fort Quitman, Texas, to the Gulf of Mexico 2
The framework for legal issues concerning water in Mexico is
based upon the Mexican Constitution, which indicates that all the water is
the property of the nation? therefore, its management as a resource is the
responsibility of the federal government The Mexican National Water Law
states that domestic and municipal uses have the highest priority when
dealing with water rights." States are responsible for the management and
distribution of municipal water and, further, have the option to pass such
rights to local governments.
In 1989, the National Water Commission (Comision Nacional del
Agua [CNA]) was created and given the responsibility of overseeing water
resources management 5 With its creation, the CNA was also charged with

* Dr. ChAvez is the Resident Adviser for Ciudad Juhrez with the International City/
County Management Association (ICMA). He is also Co-Director of the Border Information
Institute in Ciudad Juirez.
1. In conducting the research for this work, I found there was a great disposition on the
part of Mexican institutions to provide information. Two critical sources of information, the
Mexican Section of the International Water and Boundary Commission (CILA) and the
Mexican National Water Commission, were very open to providing information. In particular,
people at the CILA on some occasions went out of their way to accommodate my needs. Ialso
want to recognize Carlos Rinc6n of EDF who helped with collecting some of the information
and provided valuable comments.
2. Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio Grande, Feb 3,1944, U.S.-Mex., 59
Stat. 1219. (Hereinafter Treaty of 1944).
3.

MEx. CoNsT. (CoNsTrrucIoN PoLnIcA DR LOS EsTAxos UNxs Mi DcANos).

4. Ley de Aguas Nacionales, D.O., 1 de diciembre de 1992.
5. See Decreto por el que se Crea la Comision Nacional del Agua como Organo
Administrativo Desconcentrado de la Secretaria de Agricuttura y Recursos Hidraulicos, D.O.,
16 de enero de 1989.
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implementing water policies and making appropriate agreements with
other government entities, the private sector, and individuals.
Because the north central and northeastern geographic regions of
Mexico are subject to regular droughts, one would expect the residents
along the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo basin to have adapted to recurrent water
shortages. Nevertheless, water shortages continue to stir strong emotions.
Farmers and ranchers become more vigilant and tensions rise, placing a
strain on the existing relationships among neighbors. When this heightened
sense of concern spreads to the general population, it can lead to hysteria.
Despite the potential for conflict, these times of crisis are also times
in which creativity and innovation are possible. In this work, two aspects
of the effects of the most recent drought (1994-95) are presented: (1) the
impact on an irrigation district in which residents had to improvise, and (2)
the conflict between agricultural and municipal surface water usage
between two neighboring states, which leads to direct confrontation.
RfO GRANDE/RtO BRAVO MEXICAN BASIN
The Rio Grande/Ro Bravo Mexican Basin covers a surface of
226,275 Kr 2 with an estimated population of 9 million persons.6 The basin
encompasses five northern states, four of which are Border States. Figure
1 shows the distribution of the basin surface by state as well as the
distribution of the population.
The Rio Grande/Ro Bravo's Mexican basin has several tributaries,
the biggest of which is the Rio Conchos basin, located mostly in the state
of Chihuahua. Table 1 presents the locations by state of the main
tributaries, the aggregated usable storage capacity, and the mean yearly
drainage, as well as the percentage of the total mean average on the basin's
Mexican side. It is important to point out that the basins of the Rio Salado,
with its Venustiano Carranza Dam (usable capacity of 1,375 Mm3), and the
Rio Alamo are shared mainly by the states of Coahuila and Nuevo Le6n,
with a small fraction being in the state of Tamaulipas. In addition,
Tamaulipas, which makes up a very small fraction of the Rio Grande basin,
has in its territory the union of several tributaries of the Rio Grande that
provide a significant contribution to the overall flow of the river.
Water usage along the Rio Grande river basin is largely for
agricultural purpose (77 percent of surface and ground water). However,
agriculture use represents 80 percent of the surface water consumption in
the basin. Municipal consumption of the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo water is
significant considering that over 1.5 million people depend directly on the

6. See COMISION NACIONAL DEL AGUA UNIDAD DE CONSEJOS DE CUENCA, EL AGUA EN LA
FRONTERA NORTE (1997).
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river water. Table 2 presents the water consumption of the major cities
along the eastern part of the Rio Grande. The cases of Ciudad Gustavo Diaz
Ordaz, Reynosa, and Matamoros are notable. These cities obtained some
of their drinking water from the irrigation channels. However, starting in
1996, the CNA made provisions for these cities to obtain their water
directly from the Rio Grande.
DROUGHTS
The Basin has suffered several periods of low rainfall. The most
relevant during the last fifty years include three critical periods. The most
difficult period was between 1948 and 1954. The second period, which also
was felt in the rest of the country, occurred between 1960 and 1964. And
in 1993 and ended in 1996, causing a severe drought
the last period started
7
country.
the
all
in
As part of its policy to prevent recurring damage due to the
droughts, CNA has improved its meteorological monitoring infrastructure
to better assess the conditions and be able to implement adequate actions.
CNA also seeks, through a better understanding of the regional weather
conditions, to restrict the establishment of industrial or service activities
with high water consumption s However, there are practical limitations to
such policies. By way of example, the two largest urban centers of the
basin, Monterrey and Ciudad Ju~rez continue to grow in spite of extremely
limited water supply. Monterrey residents are used to water shortages. For
them, it is not uncommon to have running water only a few hours a day.
Ciudad Juirez is rapidly depleting its only current source of water.
Nevertheless, both cities, as well as others in the basin continue to grow,
driven by rapid economic development.
The drought of 1994-95 ultimately affected the entire Rio Grande
basin. From Figure 2, it is clear that at the beginning of 1994 the four major
dams in the basin were at about half of their usable capacity. However, by
the end of that year, all of them had reached very low levels.
The low water levels in the basin's dams were also reflected in the
water contributions in each of the tributaries to the Rio Grande/Ro Bravo.
The contribution of each of the major tributaries was reduced significantly
during 1995 as the result of very low river drainage and low water levels
in the basin's dams (Table 3).
As the drought conditions worsened at the end of 1995, several
dangerous conditions emerged throughout the basin. Since water is a vital

7. See id.
8. See id.
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element for life itself, its scarcity caused people to defend its sources
through all available means.
IMPACT TO THE IRRIGATION DISTRICTS
The Rio Grande/Rfo Bravo basin is home to several agricultural
zones, some of which are organized as irrigation districts. Table 4 presents
some of the important irrigation districts in the basin and their extensions.
One particular irrigation district (05) is in the central part of the state of
Chihuahua. This district had a unique situation. For the first time in its
short life, a little over 60 years, its main water supply, the Boquilla Dam,
was dosed during the whole year in 1995. During the worst drought of the
last fifty years (1948-54), a lower out-take was made to the Boquilla Dam
to keep the irrigation district partially operating. In 1995 that lower gate
was never opened.
Agriculture and ranching are the hardest hit by drought. As
mentioned earlier, agriculture consumes about 80 percent of the basin
surface water. Although people may think they are prepared for long
periods of low rainfall and potential water shortages, the reality is that their
activities normally seem to become "regularized" once the water supply
reaches average levels. Table 5 shows the total surface area farmed during
the worst years of the last drought for the above-mentioned irrigation
districts. It is relevant to indicate that in the case of the 026 Irrigation
District, the surface area reported includes areas that do not rely on surface
water, but rather water directly from rain fall and/or from deep wells.
Some districts have sections that use deep wells to irrigate the
surface areas of the high lands or outskirts. In the case of the 05 Irrigation
District, it has a set of wells that help complement the dams as indicated in
Table 4. These wells discharge directly into the irrigation channels to
complement the surface water supply.
Since the water supply is not secure each year, the total farmland
used at the different irrigation districts varies year after year. On years with
significant drought, the situation is more dramatic. In general, the most
common situation during a drought is the reduction of the surface
farmland used. However, where there are perennial crops, the conditions
become ones of emergency with significantly greater losses. Figure 3
presents how the perennial crop surfaces behaved during the last drought.
The most common perennial crop is alfalfa with a life cycle of three to four
years. In the 05 Irrigation District there are over 5,000 hectares of pecan
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orchards 9 It takes over 10 years for a pecan orchard to become established,
so drought could mean major loss to the economy of a region.
During droughts, farmers become very worried about water uses
and very resourceful on ways to "save the year." They look for ways to
farm, even though it may involve only a small area. Some of the strategies
that were pursued during 1994-1995 and the beginning of 1996 in Irrigation
District 05 included the following:
1. Only the land dose to the irrigation district system's deep wells
CNA authorized deep wells on private properties to support
farmed.
was
crops and livestock operations.
perennial
primarily
2. Farmers pumped water from drainage channels and rivers by
making small dams in their waterbeds to accumulate water.
3. Only crops with high value were used during the low water
supply years, primarily jalapefto pepper and cotton.
4. Some farmers went to other places to farm, with mixed results.
All of these conditions meant disruption of normal operations. In
farmers simply attempted to "save the year" by trying to break
cases,
most
even or minimize expected losses. That is, the issue for the farmers was to
keep their operation going. In 1995, the federal and state governments
helped the region by providing funds for labor-intensive projects to
counterbalance the short demand for farm labor.
The losses to pecan orchards have yet to be fully assessed. The
estimates regarding the extent of such losses vary between 10 and 50
percent. There are cases where orchards that were thought to be lost have
shown signs of recovering. Because of situations such as this, we will not
know the final toll or effects of the drought for several more years. For
now, what is known is that at least two years of production have been
significantly affected, with the consequent economic losses for the
producers and the region.
INTERSTATE CONFLICT
As mentioned above, the most important urban centers in the basin
have experienced continuous growth. Such growth has created higher
demands upon municipal services, particularly municipal water, which has
been depleting the traditional source. Monterrey's water supply has been
a major issue for the metroplex for more than two decades. This urban
center, like others, seems to have a limitless demand for water. A thirst that
may have serious implications for, and effects upon, some neighbors, as
occurred in 1996 with the state of Tamaulipas.

9. See Interviews with Comision Nacional de Agua personnel in Torreon, Coahuila
(Aug. to Oct. 1997); Interviews with farmers in the Irrigation District 05, Cd. Delicias Chih.
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The disagreement between Monterrey and the state of Tamaulipas
centered on the issue of the El Cuchillo Dam's water rights. The Dam was
recently built in the Rio San Juan before the river enters the state of
Tamaulipas and delivers its water to the Marte R. G6mez Dam, which
supports Irrigation District 026 (Figure 4).
The El Cuchillo Dam construction plans seemed to fit perfectly
with the basic concept of "sustainability." They called for water to be used
first by the municipality, and to later be treated and returned for multiple
usage downstream, primarily in agriculture. No one dared to oppose such
a "balanced" approach. However, once the plan was implemented and
actual water was to be "shared," conflict ensued. It became clear that
systems do not work normally, as they should. Apparently, the treated
water was not reaching the system downstream in the same amounts as
were pumped."0
Several reasons can be listed as the causes for the "missing" water:
the treatment plants' efficiency, the connectivity within the waste-water
treatment plants network, and farmers in the path of the "returning"
treated water saw it as an opportunity to "start" using the water. On the
other hand and due to the drought, the farmers downstream were in a
situation where they would have to scale down their operations because
their feeding dam had low water levels, even though upstream there was
a dam with "plenty" of water. That brought up the issue of the water rights
to the otherwise "well balanced" plan.
As stated above, the El Cuchillo Dam is part of a macro project to
supply the Monterrey metroplex and other communities of Nuevo Le6n
with municipal water for domestic and industrial usage. The Dam is
located on the Ro San Juan and was built to capture the water that would
otherwise end up in the Rio Grande and sometimes create flooding
problems along the lower Rio Grande valley. The El Cuchillo Dam is
located in the state of Nuevo Le6n before the Rio Pesqueria meets the Rio
San Juan, and together, as Rio San Juan, they deliver their water to the
Marte R.G6mez Dam. After the Marte R. G6mez Dam, the Rio San Juan
meets the Rio Grande. Figure 5 shows the yearly contribution of the Rio
San Juan to the Ro Grande during the past ten years. A good portion of the
water delivered to the Rio Grande by the Rio San Juan is not used, and
makes its way into the Gulf of Mexico.
A Presidential Executive Order in 1952 gave exclusive water rights
to Irrigation District 026 for those waters conducted by the Rio San Juan."

10.
11.

See ELNoRTHDE MoNER
D.O., June 1952.

, Dec. 1995 to Nov. 1996.
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This district
has 69,920 hectares, with over 2,500 individual water rights
2
users.

With the construction of the El Cuchillo Dam, Monterrey, which is
more than 100 Km away, can use the water to complement the depleted
water supplies for over 3 million people in the metroplex (Figure 6).
Monterrey built three large wastewater treatment plants (Table 6). The
effluent of one of those plants, the Dulces Nombres treatment plant, should
be returned to the Rio San Juan via the Rio Pesqueria. In 1989 and 1990,
during construction of the El Cuchillo Dam, CNA and the two states
worked out a draft agreement. This agreement made it clear that
construction of the Dam, as well as the urban use of its waters, would be
done in a way that would not jeopardize the livelihood of the 026 Irrigation
District. However, the draft agreement did not contain dear details on how
to achieve such a sensitive equilibrium.
As the El Cuchillo Dam began to capture water and send it to
Monterrey, the levels of the Marte R. G6mez water began to fall. This
resulted primarily because of the lack of rain and the smaller water
contribution made by the Rio San Juan. This situation made the 026
Irrigation District users demand water from the El Cuchillo Dam. As the
CNA tried to cope with the dilemma, the Governor of Nuevo Le6n went
public to demand that the El Cuchillo Dam waters belonged to Nuevo
Le6n. That demand triggered a public protest in Monterrey and in
Tamaulipas. Table 7 summarizes the highlights of the public debate, which
forced Governor Rizzo of Nuevo Le6n to resign in mid April, after four
months of public debate. The water issue was not the only reason for the
governor's resignation, however it had some impact in the affair.
The conflict positioned the state of Nuevo Le6n and its people
against the farmers and state of Tamaulipas, with the CNA being the
responsible agency to define the situation. Fortunately, under the Water
Treaty of 1944 between the United States and Mexico, Mexico has all the
rights for the waters of the Rio San Juan.3 Otherwise, the conflict could had
have included another more complicating dimension.
Because of the nature of the conflict, both sides claimed to have
valid legal, economic, and moral reasons. The primary arguments given by
each side for the conflict included the following:

12. See Interview with Lic. Blanca Estela Martinez, Comision Nacional de Agua, Gerencia
Estatal, Nuevo Leon (Oct. 1997).
13. See Treaty of 1944.
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Legal

Economic

Emotional

Nuevo Le6n
Municipal usage has higher
priority than agriculture
usage
The 1990 draft agreement
gives the rights to Nuevo
Le6n.
The State went into debt in
its efforts to construct the
infrastructure necessary for
the use of the water of El
Cuchillo Dam. State officials
announced that Nuevo Le6n
had paid for the Dam.
It is cheaper to compensate
the farmers.
The water sent to Monterrey
will benefit 3 million people,
whereas if the water is sent to
Tamaulipas, it will only
benefit over 2,500 farmers.

Source: El Norte de Monterrey
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Tamaulipas
A 1952 Presidential Executive
Order gives them the water
rights on Rio San Juan.
Historical rights

The 026 Irrigation District will
suffer irreparable damage, and
its users unrecoverable losses.
Even the level of compensation
being discussed is only a
fraction of the loss.

The El Cuchillo Dam was built
to avoid sending unused water
to the Gulf of Mexico; that is
the water that Nuevo Le6n has
rights to. That is the "excess"
water.

4

Thanks to the CNA, these legal arguments were settled out of
court. After the settlement, the CNA was finally able to rescue the draft
agreement between the two states. After some fine-tuning, the states signed
the agreement, which includes the provision that the Monterrey metroplex
would have first-use of the water. For that concession, Monterrey agreed
to return all treated water to the basin for the use of downstream farmers.
The economic arguments were difficult to clarify. El Norte, an
independent paper in Monterrey, published the distribution of the funds
provided for the project." From the payment distribution, the argument
that Nuevo Le6n paid for the Dam and therefore is entitled to its waters
may have not been totally valid. In truth, the federal government paid, in
full, the costs of constructing the Dam. Nuevo Le6n's contribution was
applied toward funding a sizable portion of the rest of the infrastructure

14.
15.

See EL NORTE VDMONTERREY, supn note 10.
See id.
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needed to bring the water to the Monterrey water distribution system, as
well as the needed upgrades to the distribution system.16
With regard to the water treatment plants, it is the responsibility
of all communities to return the used water adequately treated. It is
common for the communities to request assistance from the federal
government to build treatment facilities, as was the case with Monterrey.
Table 8 has a summary of the contributions made in developing the
infrastructure for the El Cuchillo Dam project.
Another economic argument, presented by the Civic Board of the
Institution of Nuevo Leon (Consejo Civico de las Institucionesde Nuevo Le6n,
A.C. [CCINLAC]) in Monterrey, regarded the issue of water values. The
group claimed that the water sent to Monterrey could have a higher value
than that sent to Tamaulipas. Like the previous argument, the accuracy of
the claim presented by CCINLAC is also questionable. CCINLAC's
analysis is summarized in Table 9.
In defense, the Tamaulipas farmers stated in their arguments
regarding crop losses that their production levels included over five tons
of sorghum and that the surface to be affected would be 60,000 hectares.
The CCINLAC analysis only addressed one product when there are at least
two other major products that are farmed in the district, corn and cotton.
Another aspect of the analysis that came into question was the cost
associated with the distribution of the water.
The emotional arguments are a reflection of this type of conflict.
Nevertheless, those arguments fuel the passions making the differences
more incompatible and giving rise to potentially explosive situations.
Finally, the legal arguments, mixed with some common sense and
the resignation of a governor, saw the conflict resolved with the signing of
the agreement by the two state governors and CNA. The agreement's major
points are the following:17
1. Every November the CNA will determine the amount of water
to be sent to the Marte R. G6mez Dam from the El Cuchillo
Dam based on the water levels of the El Cuchillo Dam.
2. Each November, the water storage at the El Cuchillo Dam
should be enough to secure the water needs of Monterrey

16. See id.
17. See Interview with Lic. Blanca Estela Martinez, supra note 12; EL NORTE DE
MONTERREY, supra note 10.
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metroplex 5 0as well as the needs of the 031 Irrigation District.
Each year, the amount of water needs to be negotiated.
Compensatory payment for the farmers in Tamualipas was
detailed.
CNA promised to help farmers in Tamaulipas have more
efficient irrigation systems and the Monterrey metroplex water
utility to overcome its debt structure.
CNA will make efforts to eliminate the illegal water intakes
between the San Juan River and Pesqueria River.
The treated water is to be piped from Monterrey to Marte R.
G6mez Dam (over 170 Kim).

A positive resolution for Tamaulipas that came out of the drought
included the provision that allowed the towns along the Rio Grande/Rfo
Bravo to draw their water supplies from the river instead of from the
irrigation channels. This will bring water savings, since some of the
irrigation channels were kept in operation all year to supply water to
different communities, even though there were no farming activities during
certain periods.1 9
CONCLUSIONS
Systems have been developed to store water for difficult times, as
well as to secure a more stable operation for cities and irrigation districts.
Engineers have built flood control systems in cities and around bodies of
water. However, we tend to forget rather quickly the crises that gave birth
to these changes. It is common to have the feeling that the water will
always be available because we have an adequate infrastructure to store
and conduct the resource. Therefore, the saying, "Those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it," is rather appropriate here.
We do not seem to keep a close eye on the management of this resource,
how effectively and efficiently it is used and what other factors affect the
resource.
Water rights will continue to be a point of conflict because of the
very nature of water supply. As the population grows and continues to
concentrate in urban centers, the pressure for water sources will increase.
18. The potential water extraction from El Cuchillo to provide water to Monterrey is
about 158 Mm' per year, given that the current infrastructure can only transport 5m3 per
second of water. In 1997, the total water released was 95 Mm3, keeping 267 Mm3; the lowest
levels of water released and water storage, since the conflict started. It is currently estimated
that 120 Mm are lost in El Chuchillo Dam due to sediments.
19. See Interviews with Ing. Gilberto Elizalde, Comision Intemacional de Limites y Agua,
Seccion Mexicana (May to Dec. 1997).
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The traditional sources are becoming depleted, and the traditional solution
of bringing the water from distant places may not be a sustainable
approach. Those distant sources are part of an existing operating system,
in use by either another urban center or by agriculture or ranching
activities. In any case, water will be drawn from other regions, affecting the
local interests and its ecological equilibrium.
The disturbance of those distant systems caused by the demand for
their water resources by another region could be seen as a threat. However,
this demand also offers great potential for innovation to solve inefficient
distribution and use practices. Why, if most of the agricultural areas in the
basin are in a semi-arid zone, are farmers not using water saving
techniques to better utilize the resource? In the best case, the most they are
doing is lining the water channels. Lining channels is not enough. Farmers
need to significantly reduce their water consumption by crops and surfaces
if they do not want to get immersed in recurrent crises because of water
shortages.
Likewise, politicians and government agencies need to develop
long term plans. As the case of the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n
demonstrates, plans do not seem to be comprehensive enough. They do not
really address all the conflicting situations. Policies are not necessarily
designed to get to the bottom of the issues. Water is a limited resource, at
least for the majority of the cities in the basin. Cities continue to demand an
increased amount of water, and the trend does not seem to have an end in
sight. Agriculture uses an incredible amount of the resource. However, in
practice there are very few tangible efforts to curb both demands, either in
agricultural or municipal usage. Placing the right value on the resource,
together with allowing a method of water banking, could be a mechanism
to promote conservation on both fronts.
Water has a distinctive behavior. It is a unique element that can
expand when it becomes solid, bring calm as it makes noise in a small
creek, and cause destruction in a major flood. Water is life but it can also
bring death, as we have learned over and over throughout time. However,
it appears that we like to solve the problems as they occur, and not deal
with the issues at their roots. That may be a pattern that we feel we can
afford, given the limited resources we allocate to address the issues.
Perhaps water, with its distinct behavior, challenges us over and
over again by always looking diligently for the path of least resistance and
eventually making its way through. It may be that water has an even
stranger behavior, that is that "even in drought, one can get water up to
one's neck," as was the case of Governor Rizzo in Nuevo Le6n. Those of us
living in this semi-arid basin must either take a long view of how to
integrally manage the water resource, or we may continue to drown in a
sea of droughts.
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Table I
Basin Main Tributaries

Main
Tributaries

State

Storage
Capacity
(Usable)
Mm,

Mean
Yearly
Drainage
Mm'

% of the
Total
Basin
Drainage

Rio Conchos
Arroyo de
las Vivoras

Chihuahua
Coahuila

> 4,000

2346
63

36.75
0.99

1016.9
16.9

68-94
38-94

San Diego
S. Rodrigo
Escondido

Coahuila
Coahuila
Coahuila

169
102
63

2.65
1.60
0.99

174.2
135.8
52.1

33-94
62-94
32-94

Rio Salado

Coahuila/
Nuevo
Le6n/

1053

16.50

365.0

53-94

169

2.65

128.7

24-94

1336

20.93

373.8

59-94

Average
Contribution
to the Rio
Grande

Period

(Period)

1420

Tamaulipas

Rio Alamo

Coahuila/
Nuevo
Le6n/
Tamaulipas

Rio San
Juan

Nuevo Le6n

Tamaulipas

1,123
(El
Cuchillo)
and
936
(Marte R
G6mez)

Sources: International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico "Flow of
the Rio Grande and Related Data," from Elephant Butte Dam, New Mexico to the Gulf of Mexico.
1994,Direct Communication with Ing. Gilberto Elizalde, Comision Internacional de Limites y
Agua,Seccion Mexicana from May to December 1997. Direct Communication with Mr. Rene
Valenzuela, International Water Border Commission, US Section May to October 1997,
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Table 2
Main Communities with Drinking Water Consumption from the Rfo Grande
Mm3
City

Population

Average

1994

1995

1996

between 84-93

Cd. Acufla, Coah
Priedra Negras, Coah
Nuevo Laredo, Tamp
Nueva Cd. Guerrero,

81,577
116,097
274,913
4,007

3.6
10.2
31.7
0.66

3.62
11.77
34.51
0.83

3.64
12.41
42.31
0.81

3.81
10.86
56.76
0.68

6,270
22,363

0.68
2.1

0.72
2.85

0.72
3.03

0.74
3.01

15,685

NA

NA

NA

1.65

336,732
363,236

NA
NA

NA
NA

NA
NA

Tamp

Cd. Mier, Tamp
Cd. Miguel Aleman,
Tamp
Cd. Gustavo Diaz
Ordaz, Tamp

Reynosa, Tamp
Matamoros, Tamp
I

I_

I_

I

48.55
19.18 (last
six months)

NA: Not Applicable because they had other surface sources (Irrigation channels)
Source: International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico "Flow
of the Rio Grande and Related Data," from Elephant Butte Dam, New Mexico to the Gulf
of Mexico. 1993 Ditto, 1994 Direct Communication with Ing. Gilberto Elizalde, Comision
Internacional de Limites y Agua, Seccion Mexicana from May to December 1997.
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Table 7
Conflict Events

December 7, 1995
December 18, 1995
January 2, 1996
January 5, 1996

January 20, 1996
January 21, 1996
April 18, 1996
April 18,1996
July 23, 1996
October 24, 1996

October 25, 1996
October 30, 1996

November 2, 1996
November 3, 1996

It is announced that 160 MmJ will be released from the El
Cuchillo Dam to Tamaulipas.
Letter from Nuevo Le6n's citizens to president Zedillo
asking to hold the delivery of the waters to Tamaulipas.
S6crates Rizzo, Governor of Nuevo Le6n, ensures that
Nuevo Le6n will not release a millimeter of water.
CNA ordered to open the dam gates. The state government
obtains a restriction order from a judge that allows the state
to close the dam gates again. 7.5 Mm3 are released from the
dam.
CNA ordered to reopen the dam gates.
CNA concludes routing 200 Mm3 to the Marte R. G6mez
Dam, which generates criticism against the state
government.
License Petition from S6crates Rizzo, State Governor, stops
the conflict.
Interim Governor, Benjamin Clariond, promises a new winwin agreement.
National Water Commission announces the elaboration of
the agreement between the two state governments about
how to manage the El Cuchillo Dam waters.
One of the solutions for the El Cuchillo Dam dispute is the
construction of an aqueduct from the treatment plant Dulces
Nombres to the Marte R. G6mez Dam, in order to route
treated water every day, Nuevo Le6n governor said.
Benjamin Clarion announces that before the month ends,
the deal will be signed.
El Norte newspaper publishes the new rule to utilize water
from the dam. The rule states that if the dam reaches a level
greater than 315 million cubic meters November 1st of each
year, any surplus will go to Matte R. G6mez Dam in
Tamaulipas.
The signing of the agreement is postponed to the first days
of the month.
Agreement endorsement is stopped for several reasons:
disagreement about indemnity sum between Nuevo Le6n
and Tamaulipas and federal funds to build Las Blancas
Dam, the aqueduct from the treatment plant to Marte R.
G6mez Dam, and the infrastructure to improve water usage
I in 026 Irrigation District.

November 13, 1996 The Agreement is finally signed.
Source: Newspaper articles from El Norte de Monterrey from December 1995 to
November 1996.
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Table 8
How much was paid by each party?
(Millions of US Dollars)
State of Nuevo
Le6n
El Cuchillo Dam
Wastewater Treatment Plants
Farmers' compensation

65
4.5

Aqueduct
Transference Ring

147
40

Federal
Government
120
69
6.6
-

87.4**
160.5*
Others
283.0
417.8
Total
;ource: Newspaper articles from El Norte de Monterrey from December
1995 to November 1996. Data from Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey, CNA
qote: The approximate data and given separately.
Includes expenses like hydraulic pumps, pipes and collectors
'* Rehabilitation of the Anzalduas irrigation channel, RODHE, and search of new source.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

Table 9
(Amounts in Pesos)
How much will be collected if 200 Mm3 were to be sold in Monterrey?
Total amount to be billed
Cost per Cubic Meter
Gross Income
Cost of Processing
NET INCOME

200 million cubic meters
$3.24
$648 million
$150 million
$498 million

... How much will the 026 Irrigation District products be valued?
Total of Surface farmed (Hectares)
Production by Hectare
Total from the Harvest
Price of Sorghum per Ton
Total Value of the Production

47,000
4 Tons
188,000 Tons
$1,300
$244,400,000

Therefore it will be cheaper to compensate the farmers for the water .....
$498,000,000
If the water were sold in Monterrey
Minus the value of the farms production $244,400,000
$253,600,000
There is a positive balance
Source: Newspaper articles from El Norte de Monterrey from December
1995 to November 1996.
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Figure I
Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin
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Source: EL AGUA EN LA FRONTERA NORTE. SiNTESIS Comisi6n Nacional del Agua
Unidad de Consejos de Cuenca. 1997

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

.2

,,

I.

.

E
0

_

4

, .I'

0

:
0 W)

IT

U

I,,,
It

++;1'

'i

"
'

-o~/

og~l

/o

"-p

1

o-o0

-.

_.

LEARNING FROM DROUGHT

Winter 19991

0

oo

cc
0
(0

U0

co

o
V)4

0

_

o0o

°°°
%-

"

ooo
°°°
,€..

.-

C

p

2

0

58

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Figure 4
Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin
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